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GERMANY’S GREEN ENERGY REVOLUTION
Challenging the Theory and Practice of Institutional Change
Carol Hager
Political Science, Bryn Mawr College
ABSTRACT
The energy revolution poses a fundamental challenge to the German corpo-
ratist institutional model. The push for renewables in Germany arose almost
entirely outside the prevailing channels of institutional power. Eventually, fed-
eral legislation helped support the boom in local energy production that was
already underway, and it encouraged the further development of new forms of
community investment and citizen participation in energy supply. Recently,
the federal government has tried to put the genie back in the bottle by shifting
support to large energy producers. But, as this article shows, the energy transi-
tion has provided a base for local power that cannot easily be assailed. The
debate over German energy policy is becoming a contest between centralized
and decentralized models of political and economic power. Prevailing institu-
tionalist theories have difficulty accounting for these developments. I analyze
the local development of renewable energy by means of a case study of the
Freiburg area in southwestern Germany, which has evolved from a planned
nuclear power and fossil fuel center to Germany’s “solar region”. Incorporat-
ing insights from ecological modernization theory, I show how the locally
based push for renewables has grown into a challenge to the direction of Ger-
man democracy itself. 
KEYWORDS
citizen initiatives, corporatism, ecological modernization, energy transition,
historical institutionalism, renewable energy
Introduction
Germany has become a world leader in transitioning from a fossil-fuel
economy to a renewable energy-based one. This transition is remarkable
for its speed—the first national “feed-in law” facilitating the development of
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renewables was passed in 1990, and by 2013 renewables accounted for
nearly 25 percent of Germany’s gross electricity consumption (see Figure
1). What is less visible is the local networking that began in the 1970s and
promoted this change. Renewable energy technologies emerged from and
remained embedded in a local milieu characterized by concern with com-
munity quality of life and a commitment to grassroots activism. This move-
ment crystallized with antinuclear protest, which was also a motivation for
innovating in renewables.
Figure 1: GERMANY’S POWER MIX IN 2013
Remarkably, the early push for renewable energy grew up almost
entirely outside the normal institutional channels of political participation
and policymaking. German national-level and even state-level political
institutions fought this change at first. So did the large energy utilities. Even-
tually, renewables advocates penetrated the federal ministries and the Bun-
destag. Federal legislation helped enlarge the boom in local energy
production that was already underway, and it encouraged the further devel-
opment of new forms of community investment and citizen participation in
energy supply. 
Recently, the federal government has shifted support back to the big
energy producers. It has done this through direct mechanisms, like placing a
ceiling on photovoltaic generation, which tends to be small-scale and pri-
vately owned. It has also acted indirectly by allowing policy “drift”—failure
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to promote the new grid technologies necessary for decentralized supply, for
example, and failure to make use of built-in mechanisms to control price
increases.1 But, the local and regional networks that were responsible for
creating the push for renewables are still in place and are pushing back.
They have developed their own supporting institutions, which supply
“counter-expertise” in energy matters and which have come to occupy a
prominent place in the German policy making scene. Furthermore, local
economies have a large stake in the decentralized model of energy supply.
Many municipal governments and private citizens have invested in renew-
ables projects, and their success has empowered communities that are other-
wise suffering from negative demographic and economic trends. Renewable
energy has become a widely supported symbol of local independence. In a
sense, the energy transition is shaping up into a battleground over the direc-
tion of German democracy itself. 
The Energy Transition and Theories of Institutional Change
The energy transition can be a testing ground for theories of institutional
continuity and change. The historical institutionalist literature focuses
largely on why institutions tend to persist and how institutional breakdown
or decay can occur as a result of shocks from outside.2 Kathleen Thelen
points out important limitations to this literature. She observes that institu-
tions evolve in subtle and cumulative ways having to do with processes of
inclusion and exclusion of aggrieved groups. Studies of institutional devel-
opment should pay attention not just to what happens in the institutional
core of the state, but also to “processes unfolding on the periphery” as they
affect the center. The point is that excluded, aggrieved groups promote
institutional change either by mobilizing from the outside, which may lead
to institutional breakdown, or infiltrating institutions and promoting change
from the inside, which may lead to “conversion”.3 At the same time, actors
already included can make moves to reassert their power within institutions
as they are challenged by newcomers or outside groups. This dynamic
within institutions, which tends to be cumulative rather than abrupt, is the
focus of much recent historical institutionalist analysis.4
This literature focuses on the way that endogenous and exogenous par-
ticipants act on the central institutions of the state. At first glance, this focus
would seem to be appropriate for Germany, whose policymaking style has
generally been characterized as corporatist. The German system has clear
insiders and outsiders. Policy is formulated by bureaucratic experts in coop-
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eration with peak associations representing major societal interests (usually
labor and industry). Elected officials are involved only after the policy
details have been worked out behind the scenes. This system puts a pre-
mium on technical expertise and tends to exclude noneconomic interests.5
A closer look at the trajectory of renewable energy in Germany suggests,
however, that a more differentiated view is necessary. The move toward
renewables arose from antisystem protest and took place almost entirely
outside, and partly as a rejection of, the central state.
The German story may be better understood by bringing institutional the-
ory in conversation with ecological modernization theory, which helps eluci-
date the processes unfolding on the periphery more on their own terms.6
John Dryzek et al., in their book Green States and Social Movements, also focus
on the relationship between states and outside groups. But, they add key
insights about the ways that outside groups achieve influence in different
institutional settings. They classify states’ treatment of outside groups along
dimensions of active and passive inclusion and exclusion. Corporatist Ger-
many is classified as passive exclusive in part because the state does not pur-
posefully shape societal participation but does act as gatekeeper, granting
privileged access to certain groups. In addition, access by oppositional
groups is limited by “the Rechtstaat tradition that sees the public interest in
abstract, legal, and unitary terms, and an associated organic view of state and
society that does not recognize conflicts, and so regards any opposition to
the work of the administrative state as illegitimate and obstructive.”7 In the
early years, fledgling environmental groups were regarded with suspicion by
the center and kept well away from the core imperatives of the state.8
Dryzek’s insight is that exclusion of environmental groups may actually
foster a healthier civil society than inclusion where movements achieve lit-
tle real influence. Moreover, Dryzek departs from Thelen by claiming that
oppositional civil society may be able to create both policy change and
change in the broader society even in the absence of overt institutional
change at the center. This claim is borne out in the German case: the anti-
nuclear movement was not coopted, nor did it prompt much institutional
change at first, but the movement exercised a great deal of influence over
energy policy nevertheless. Moreover, the passive exclusion of the move-
ment “helped fashion a strong oppositional counter-culture which went
beyond specific policy goals to include issues of identity and alternative
forms of action and behaviour.”9 Nuclear power became and has remained
the focal point for a critique of technocratic decision making and for experi-
ments in democratization and decentralization of authority that have gone
hand-in-hand with the local promotion of renewables. 
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Dryzek’s ecological modernization theory does not tell the whole story,
either. The German case illustrates how the oppositional local culture fos-
tered by passive exclusion is tied to technological innovation. The theory
proposes that, when environmental protection becomes linked to the core
economic imperatives of the state, environmental activists will be included
(or coopted). Industry, already granted access to the state’s core, will inno-
vate in response to citizen environmental concerns. In renewable energy
development, however, traditional industry has mostly resisted developing
new energy technologies. Indeed, these are of a form—open source, local,
small-scale—that fits uncomfortably to the traditional energy model. As
David Toke points out, the critical public’s involvement in energy politics is
crucial for explaining the innovations that have occurred.10 In Germany,
the core industrial players responded to the local development of renew-
able energy technologies with retrenchment and use of political influence
to reassert their monopoly control over energy. The lively debate over
alternatives to fossil fuel and nuclear energy took place at first largely
among the excluded groups, not at the center, and fostered networks of
innovation11 connected to this oppositional local culture. These networks
maintain an uneasy relationship with the traditional energy giants, which
still have not changed their business model to accommodate the array of
new participants.12
Institutional accounts focusing on access to the core of the state may
underestimate the extent to which social movements can create change by
reshaping public perceptions of an issue from outside (and sometimes
against) those political institutions.13 This reshaping may have far-reaching
consequences not only for public opinion, but also for policy makers as well
as investors and developers of new technologies. As for the former, there is
considerable evidence that anticipation of public protest now constrains
German policy makers’ choices at the policy formulation stage.14 This has
generally worked against large-scale energy projects. As for the latter, social
movements help “shape entrepreneurs’ perceptions of social and economic
opportunities, as well as their motivation to take risks to exploit these oppor-
tunities.”15 This has worked in favor of the development of small-scale
renewable energy technologies and local renewable energy economies.
The pattern of passive exclusion was important for technological and
political innovation arising from the grass roots—the development of net-
works of innovation that eventually influenced federal policy but did not
wholly depend on it for the spread of renewables. The prevailing institu-
tions did not open up to renewables advocates at first, so they established
their own, competing institutional network. Strengthened through iterated
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conflict and pushed along at critical points by nuclear accidents and public
concerns about climate change, this alternative network gradually won the
ear of the German public, and legitimacy on energy issues shifted to these
alternative institutions. Advocates did penetrate federal institutions, and
with their help, federal policymaking eventually did accelerate the change
that was already underway. But the local networks were already in place
with an independent base of support, which continued to grow. 
The necessity of changes to the federal renewable energy law, now that
renewables account for more than a quarter of gross electricity consump-
tion, has given an opening to conventional energy interests to reposition
themselves.16 Endogenous institutional players are attempting to turn the
machinery of the federal government back to supporting a more centralized
model of energy production implemented by the big utilities. Nevertheless,
the local players, in part because of their exclusion, have developed their
own power base from which to defend the decentralized model of renew-
able energy supply that has developed over the past three decades. The
societal change and technological innovation that made the energy transfor-
mation possible have not depended upon movement at the core, so theories
focusing on change there will miss important explanatory factors. Two mod-
els—for the organization of energy supply and for the organization of soci-
ety—compete for Germany’s future.
The remainder of this article explains the development and persistence
of these two models. The following section focuses on national-level
energy policymaking and grassroots opposition, beginning with the anti-
nuclear protest of the 1970s. In the ensuing decades, the passive-exclusive
German state succeeded neither in eliminating the opposition to its energy
policy nor in coopting it entirely. I then turn to the growth of networks of
innovation at the local and regional levels that propelled the German
energy transition from below. This section is based on a case study of the
Freiburg region in the southwestern German state of Baden-Württemberg.
I use a process-tracing methodology to show how local citizens formed
their own networks of supporting institutions, which defy the core/periph-
ery relationship assumed in much of the literature.17 The qualitative data
were compiled from some forty-two interviews with participants in the
Freiburg region’s energy economy between November 2012 and July
2014. They are supplemented with archival research and reports from
journals and newspapers. The last section shows how debates over changes
to Germany’s Renewable Energy Act demonstrate the confrontation of
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Overview of the German Energy Transition
Grassroots Citizen Mobilization and the Birth of an Eco-culture
The German energy debate arose around the permitting process for large,
state-sponsored industrial projects. This process involved closed-door col-
laboration between federal and state economics bureaucracies and large
energy utilities. The latter were nominally privately owned but enjoyed
substantial subsidies. Lack of public access to this process provoked the citi-
zen activism that characterized West German energy politics in the 1970s
and 1980s.
The West German government’s initial reaction to the energy crisis of the
1970s was to redouble its support for coal and nuclear power. Many citizens
objected, however, and, from mid decade on, public protest against nuclear
and coal-fired power plants grew. Energy protest was embedded in a larger
array of citizen movements, including environment, women’s rights, civil
rights, and the peace movement, concerned with the quality of life and criti-
cal of what Jürgen Habermas termed the economic and administrative “sys-
tem.”18 The protesters blamed Germany’s corporatist authority structure for
policy decisions that seemed sharply at odds with citizen values. They were
especially critical of the established political parties, which in their view had
failed to represent new societal impulses in government. By the mid 1970s,
more West Germans identified themselves as members of grassroots “citizen
initiatives” than of all political parties combined.19 Of these, environmental
citizen groups were by far the largest. Disgruntled citizens lacking access to
the core of the state organized outside it and offered a fundamental critique
of it. The federal government responded initially in the way that Dryzek et
al. describe, by vilifying the movements, putting down demonstrations with
force, and attempting to curtail the citizen participation provisions of the
planning process.20 Rather than quelling the unrest, this response seemed to
confirm the meta-level concerns of the protesters.
The citizen activism around energy projects contributed to the founding
of green and alternative voting lists throughout West Germany and eventu-
ally the national-level Greens in 1980. The original members conceptual-
ized it not as a conventional political party, but as the parliamentary arm of
the citizen initiative movement.21 The Greens entered the Bundestag in
1983, where they worked to achieve more transparency in policy making
and to bring the concerns of the citizen initiative movement into govern-
ment by carving out a more substantive role for the legislature. One of their
early actions was to force the formation of two special parliamentary com-
missions on energy issues. The many local and regional parties/voting lists,
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along with the national-level Greens, formed a lasting tie between the chal-
lengers and the political establishment, but they had not yet penetrated the
federal ministries at the core of state power.22
In the face of continued protests, public support for nuclear energy
declined. The 1986 explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in
Ukraine turned the West German public strongly and permanently against
nuclear power.23 This industry had occupied a key place in the govern-
ment’s long-term energy strategy. It had been especially hostile to the partic-
ipatory concerns of environmentalists and to the introduction of renewable
energy,24 so its weakened position provided an opening for renewables
advocates. The fossil fuel energy industry fared little better in the public eye
after dramatic cases of forest die-off (Waldsterben) were linked to acid rain.
Global warming became a target of grassroots mobilization by the 1980s,
helped along by several widely publicized scientific reports warning of
impending climate disaster. By the end of the decade, all the major political
parties had declared climate change one of their priorities.25
It was against this backdrop that the German renewables industry arose.
Citizen initiative groups were not solely focused on protest; they also
pushed for decentralized, environmentally friendly industry and participa-
tory decision making, which to them went hand in hand. This is the opposi-
tional counterculture to which Dryzek refers. E.F. Schumacher’s book Small
Is Beautiful became something of a guidebook to the movements. Sustain-
able production using renewable resources was already a focus for them;
renewable energy fit well with the new environmental paradigm, and
experiments with renewables became part of the movements’ general
attempt to practice what they preached locally. Thus, grassroots groups
were key to embedding alternative technologies in society before there was a
federal policy framework.26
There were lots of experiments with small-scale solar and wind projects
beginning in the 1970s. Some of these came directly from participants in the
antinuclear movement. Wind power was developed by farmers, supported
by greens, and helped along by people building prototypes in backyards,
who were acting not for profit, but rather out of conviction. “Hence,” writes
David Toke, “an idealistic belief in a new alternative technology set up the
conditions for a niche to develop in ways in which conventional industry,
with its patent-based secrecy and expectation of early commercial returns,
would find very difficult to replicate.”27 The local scale encouraged experi-
mentation of a type that the big players could not coopt. It was completely
separated from them and self-consciously opposed to their model. In this
way, the passive exclusion that helped foster a strong counterculture also
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inspired technological advances in keeping with its alternative, decentral-
ized societal model.
Early Federal Policymaking and the Big Utilities
The federal government’s contribution to this early phase mostly took the
form of R&D funding through the Ministry of Research. It enabled universi-
ties, institutes, and firms to experiment with renewables, provided that
these remain in a pre-market phase. Jacobsson and Lauber note that the
more powerful Ministry of Economics kept a watchful eye on this develop-
ment and generally supported the energy industry’s desire to keep new pro-
ducers off the market. Nevertheless, they write, “in spite of the fringe status
of that R&D, a broad academic cum industrial knowledge base began to be
built up ... for both wind turbines and solar cells.”28 But, this base was
mostly outside the core institutions of the state. Partly in response to antinu-
clear activism, a publicly funded pilot wind turbine, Growian, was erected
in northern Germany in the 1980s. The oversized turbine never functioned
properly and was soon shut down; nuclear energy opponents “saw the pro-
ject as a feint on the part of the state designed to prove that wind power was
a lame duck.”29
The concept of a feed-in tariff originated in Denmark and was developed
in Germany not by the core players, but rather in the “counterexpert” insti-
tutes that had arisen from the energy protest of the previous decades.30 A
coalition of alternative energy advocates proposed the first feed-in tariff law.
The law allowed small energy producers to feed extra electricity into the
grid at a guaranteed price. Pressured by the public unrest and by organized
advocates and their allies in the Bundestag, the government passed the law
in 1990. The established utilities, busy with German reunification, did not
pay much attention to it. In retrospect, it is clear that they misjudged its
potential to alter the system of energy production.31 The Ministry of Eco-
nomics tried to substitute voluntary feed-in tariffs for a legislative mandate,
but this effort failed.32 The feed-in law accelerated the boom in small-scale
renewable energy production, especially solar.
The interaction between the federal government, industry, and grass-
roots activists evolved from the 1970s to the 1990s. Government planners
and investors in large projects wanted to avoid costly delays and to pro-
mote long-term “planning security.” They had pursued this goal in the
1970s by attempting to repress citizen participation. In the 1990s, “even
though the institutional configuration of the state had not changed much,”
writes Dieter Rucht, “state administrations had become more receptive to
[activists’] demands.”33 For their part, citizen groups diversified their strate-
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gies, promoting collaboration for expansion of renewables while maintain-
ing the potential for grassroots protest, an inside-outside strategy that pro-
duced a two-pronged pattern of influence. The German environmental
movement mobilized successfully to defend the feed-in tariffs on several
occasions when the coal and nuclear energy industries tried to pressure the
government to rescind them. Moreover, renewables producers began to
professionalize, forming their own trade associations and gaining support
from some existing organizations. 
The law survived legislative and legal challenges at the national and EU
levels. The traditional utilities joined with the Federation of German Indus-
try and the Ministry of Economics to demand a reduction in the feed-in tar-
iffs. They also challenged the law unsuccessfully in the European Court of
Justice, arguing that it constituted a hidden subsidy. “The energy utilities
had come to realise,” writes Christoph Stefes, “that the [feed-in law] might
herald the first step towards a new energy system that favoured small and
decentralised generation.”34
The Red-Green Coalition and the Renewable Energy Act of 2000
A Red/Green coalition government took office in 1998, some of whose
members had first entered politics through the protest movements of the
1970s. The new government was much more committed to ending nuclear
power and supporting the transition to renewable energy. Prominent
among them was longtime solar energy advocate Hermann Scheer (SPD),
who fought for the successful implementation of a “100,000 Roof Program”
for solar power as well as a revised feed-in law, the Renewable Energy Act
of 2000.35 The new law expanded support for renewable energy and
encouraged small producers by establishing guaranteed feed-in prices over
a twenty-year period. The offered rates would decline over time to account
for technological improvements. After gaining seats in the 2002 federal
elections, the Greens successfully pushed for renewable energy to be
moved from the purview of the Economics Ministry (led by the Social
Democrats) to the Environment Ministry (led by the Greens).36 This led to
a reframing of renewable energy as a matter of environmental necessity
rather than as a potential competitor to conventional energy sources. 
This shift, while important, fell short of institutional conversion dis-
cussed by Thelen. The Environment Ministry remained at a distance to the
core of state power and was susceptible to influence by subsequent
appointment of less renewables-friendly ministers. The Economics Min-
istry, still the lead bureaucracy for energy policy, was much more resistant
and protective of the traditional utilities, as Dryzek would predict: “patterns
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of passive exclusion still tend to prevail in policy areas dominated by pow-
erful economic interests.”37 After the 2013 federal elections the ministry
was renamed Ministry for Economics and Energy, reasserting its centrality
to the energy transition.
The Greens fell out of the governing coalition in 2005, and subsequent,
conservative-led governments have been less friendly to renewables. When
the Merkel administration tried to reduce renewable energy subsidies, shift
support to the coal industry, and extend the life of Germany’s nuclear
plants, however, a new wave of protest mobilization arose. A 2010 antinu-
clear demonstration in Berlin was estimated to have been the largest since
the 1980s. Mass demonstrations followed the chancellor’s apparent reversal
in early 2011 of her commitment to decommissioning Germany’s aging
nuclear power plants. The Fukushima disaster in Japan shortly thereafter
sent tens of thousands more antinuclear activists into the streets. Merkel’s
positions contributed to the Christian Democrats’ loss of two state elections
that year to Red/Green coalitions and forced her reluctant government to
commit to ending nuclear power in Germany by 2022 and achieving 80
percent renewable energy by 2050.
Thus, grassroots activism forced the federal government onto its current
energy path and kept it there, both by making other alternatives politically
infeasible and by making inroads into the legislature and Environment Min-
istry at a key juncture. The Economics Ministry did not really budge, though,
and the governing coalition changed to one less favorable to the challengers.
For their part, the big utilities were late getting into the game, declining to
invest in renewables development and pressuring the government to curtail
small-scale wind and solar once these began to take off locally.
My central claim is that renewables advocates have done more than pre-
vent policy rollback. They have created a whole renewables-based infra-
structure intimately connected to their ideas about grassroots democracy and
community empowerment that is very skeptical of corporatist power. Their
networks preceded the feed-in laws and in a sense made them possible. To
understand how they formed and why they persist, we now turn to the
prominent case of the Freiburg region in Germany’s southwestern corner. 
Case Study: Network of Innovation in the Upper Rhine Region 
of Baden-Württemberg
The area around Freiburg is now known as Germany’s “Solar Region.” It
was not always this way. The West German, French, and Swiss governments
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planned a massive industrial buildout of the Upper Rhine region between
Basel and Mannheim in the 1970s.38 The region became a center of citizen
protest, particularly against nuclear power. The movement against a
planned nuclear plant at Wyhl, near Freiburg, included an eight-month-
long site occupation beginning in 1975 and a protracted administrative
court battle. The protesters encompassed a broad spectrum of the popula-
tion that defied political stereotypes—from vintners and small farmers to
university professors and students. Their actions drew support from all over
West Germany and beyond. 
There was a strong feeling among the protesters that the principled rejec-
tion of nuclear power obligated them to offer alternatives. During the site
occupation, some of the participants experimented with solar collectors. An
exhibit of their homemade devices, in 1976 near the occupied site, drew
more than 12,000 visitors.39 People began to request solar collectors for
their private homes. For many, the successful protest at Wyhl was the inspi-
ration to work for a different energy future in their subsequent careers.
Connections forged at Wyhl gave rise to a network of innovation that tied
in with the nascent environmental and other citizen movements critical of
the state and focused on local change (“think globally, act locally”). This
was well before any federal legislative framework for promoting renewables
existed—in Dryzek’s terms, before the energy transition reached the core of
the state. The network grew to the point where it gave the region a new
identity that attracted ecology-minded citizens from elsewhere.
The network of innovation for renewables was built from several impor-
tant components. These are described in more detail below.
Institutions of Counterexpertise—the Eco-Institute
The Institutefor Applied Ecology (Eco-Institute) Freiburg was founded in
1977 by twenty-seven scientifically trained veterans of the Wyhl protest.
They noted that the fate of large energy projects was determined in the
technical permitting process, and that lay citizens were at a distinct disad-
vantage in this process. They dedicated the new institute to generating what
they termed “counterexpertise” in order to help citizens challenge the
claims put forth by government and industry experts:
In court proceedings and hearings the critical citizen encounters a pha-
lanx of experts who advise the bureaucracy and industry. More and
more citizens recognize that science is not free of [special] interests.
Only a few scientists have been prepared up to now to support the citi-
zens. In the long run, however, the citizen initiatives will only succeed
in achieving their demands in planning and in court if they themselves
deliver the necessary scientific foundation ...40
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The Eco-Institute’s young scientists not only produced technical informa-
tion and testimony for these permitting disputes, they also broadened the
energy debate generally by authoring their own expert reports. One of the
first of these was entitled Energy Turning Point. It made the then-radical pro-
posal that Germany withdraw completely from nuclear energy and showed
how it could be done.41 Government- and industry-funded mainstream sci-
ence was uniformly on the side of nuclear power, and it was hard for critical
scientists to find a research home. The Eco-Institute offered one. Former
Eco-Institute CEO Rainer Griesshammer recounts that the relentless attacks
from establishment science shook the confidence of the Eco-Institute scien-
tists to the point where they checked their findings three or four times before
publishing them.42 Their prognoses, however, were borne out repeatedly,
and with time, the institute’s reputation grew. It also benefitted from an
informal partnership with the emerging alternative press. Reiner Metzger,
Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper Die Tageszeitung (taz), said, “After
the founding of taz, the Eco-Institute was a virtual cornerstone of its report-
ing: finally there were experts whom the extensive eco-scene trusted.”43 Dis-
senting viewpoints on energy became much more visible and mainstream in
the course of the 1980s, thanks largely to the Eco Institute.
The Eco-Institute saw its fortunes rise along with public concern over
nuclear power and climate change. It now employs more than 100 re -
searchers at three locations in Germany. It takes on about 300 projects
annually, with clients ranging from private citizens to national and EU gov-
ernments. While its science has become accepted by mainstream actors, the
institute retains its independence and its ties to the oppositional grass roots. 
Local Renewables Businesses
The protest at Wyhl inspired experimentation with solar energy technolo-
gies. Werner Mildebrath, who displayed his homemade solar collector at
the 1976 exhibition mentioned above, received so many requests for solar
collectors that he opened his own small business. He eventually won con-
tracts from as far away as Egypt.44 The burgeoning local demand for solar
installations provided an opportunity for ancillary businesses such as car-
pentry and metalworking firms. This was long before there was any money
to be made by feeding power into the grid; the early customers were moti-
vated by conviction, not profit.45 Wyhl veterans founded other high-visibil-
ity businesses that have since become calling cards for the city of Freiburg.
One of these is solar architecture. Rolf Disch designed the city’s first solar
housing development, fronted by a solar-powered commercial develop-
ment known as the “Sun Ship”. Disch also designed the first private plus-
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energy home, which serves as a demonstration project and also his private
residence.46 Freiburg and the nearby Black Forest have also become centers
for ecotourism, capturing numerous awards for their innovations in this
branch. Renewable energy businessman Jan Bresinsky says today, it is the
region’s small and medium-sized enterprises, many of them family owned,
that profit from the energy transition.47 They are more nimble and innova-
tive than the big firms in a branch where customer orientation and innova-
tion will be highly prized going forward.
Manufacturing
United by their interest in a renewable energy future, individuals in many dif-
ferent branches built an interconnected network that began to attract other
pioneers to the Freiburg region. Manfred Volk took part in the Wyhl demon-
strations as a student. Committed to promoting renewable energy technolo-
gies, he founded Volk Hydropower. His Black Forest factory produces water
turbines and other equipment for customers worldwide.48 Georg Salvamoser
moved to Freiburg from Bavaria in order to open a photovoltaic installation
firm and network with other solar pioneers in the region. He invested the
profits from that business into Freiburg’s first solar module manufacturing
firm, the Solar Factory, which opened in 1998. The Solar Factory’s innovative
design made it the first zero-emissions manufacturing plant in Europe.49
R&D—The Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems
Another facet of the regional transition from protest to innovation was the
establishment of an R&D institute devoted to solar energy. The German
government and the traditional utilities had been slow to recognize the
commercial potential of renewables. Adolf Goetzberger, a renowned physi-
cist who headed the Fraunhofer Institute for Solid State Physics in Freiburg,
became fascinated with the potential for solar energy and lobbied the non-
profit Fraunhofer Society to let him open a solar research institute in 1981.
The Fraunhofer Society “occupies a mediating position between the funda-
mental research of universities and industrial practice,” requiring that a cer-
tain percentage of its funding come from contracts with industry.50 The
society was skeptical that solar energy could pay its way, but Goetzberger
thought the positive climate in the Freiburg area would help applied
research find a foothold there. The institute started with eighteen employ-
ees. Despite some “cliffhangers” into the 1990s, it became a European
leader in development of solar cell technology and eventually thermal con-
version, smart grids, and storage technologies. Today, with 1,200 employ-
ees, the Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems is the largest solar
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research institution in Europe. It trains hundreds of students for careers in
the solar energy industry and partners with local and regional organizations
promoting solar energy technologies.
Goetzberger networked extensively with renewable energy researchers
elsewhere in Europe. As the regional network of innovation grew, it began
to draw visitors from a wider radius. In 2000, Freiburg became home to the
Intersolar Exhibition, billed as the world’s largest exhibition for the solar
industry. The Intersolar outgrew its Freiburg site and was moved to Munich
in 2008.51 Led by the Department of Forestry, several faculties of Freiburg
University founded a Center for Renewable Energies (ZEE) in 2007, which
affiliated with, among others, the Fraunhofer ISE and the Eco-Institute.
Education
Another Wyhl veteran, Olaf Srowig, became director of Freiburg’s Richard
Fehrenbach Vocational School in 1982 and set about reorienting its mission
toward the training of a skilled workforce for the renewable energy econ-
omy.52 The school opened a “solar tower” on the grounds to teach students
about the workings and maintenance of solar energy systems. Fehrenbach
students are currently working on cutting-edge latent heat storage and solar
cooling technologies.53 They collaborate with research institutions in the city,
particularly the Fraunhofer Institute, but their focus is on practical applica-
tions and educating students to develop their ideas independently. The school
also provides a skilled workforce for the many small family craft businesses in
the region. According to Srowig, 80 percent of these now have renewable
energy work as part of their operations. With the region’s changing demogra-
phy, there is an unfilled demand for skilled employees. Family-owned busi-
nesses that have been handed down from father to son for generations often
have no one to take over the shop. The school helps by supplying people
who have not just basic skills, but also the creativity to innovate.
One of the features of the site occupation at Wyhl was the “Community
College of the Wyhl Forest.” Participants with specific expertise made  public
presentations at the site. The presentations covered a spectrum 
from nuclear physics to botany to folk music. Many of the lectures were
designed to educate the local public about nuclear power and other energy
technologies. The Community College was so popular that it continued long
after the site occupation ended, hosting presentations in the surrounding vil-
lages for eight years. Later, an organizer of the Community College joined
forces with the continuing education program at Freiburg University to give
occasional weekend lectures on energy topics. This variant of the “Saturday
University” works to inform the population of the entire cross-border Upper
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Rhine region about new developments on the energy scene.54 Freiburg thus
offers university education connected to cutting-edge R&D in renewables,
vocational education for the regional renewables economy, and continuing
education to keep the active public informed of the latest developments.
Political Activism—NGOs and Greens
The protest at Wyhl coincided with the founding of Germany-wide environ-
mental NGOs. BUND, the German Association for Environmental and Nature
Protection (Bund Umwelt- und Naturschutz Deutschland) was a new kind of
group that combined the political mobilization of a citizen initiative with the
nature protection emphasis of traditional environmental organizations.55 Its
first managing director, Erhard Schulz, had been a participant in the Com-
munity College at Wyhl. He devoted BUND’s resources to demonstrating the
feasibility of an environmentally friendly local economy. The Eco-Station in
Freiburg is perhaps its most popular project. Maintained by the City of
Freiburg and run by BUND, it serves as an environmental education center
and demonstration project in ecological living.56 It includes a “nature house”
that showcases both natural, traditional construction techniques and state-of-
the-art solar and cogeneration technologies. It is surrounded by organic gar-
dens that illustrate various ecotopes. Built to inspire ideas about living in
harmony with nature, the Eco-Station hosts educational events for the gen-
eral public and for schoolchildren, including a summer camp.
The grassroots activism around energy projects also contributed to the
founding of green and alternative voting lists throughout West Germany and
eventually the national-level Greens in 1980. While antinuclear activists and
renewables advocates were found across the party spectrum, the party orga-
nizations had been slow to take up the cause. Veterans of the Wyhl protest
felt ill served by the existing regional party constellation, particularly the
conservative Christian Democrats. They decided to try for direct representa-
tion by running one of their members for the state legislature. Although he
ran under the auspices of one of the smaller political parties, none of his
campaign materials mentioned any party affiliation. Instead, he used the
label “Citizen Initiative.” His convincing win signaled to the group that they
could gain local office with candidates connected directly to the antinuclear
movement. This was one impetus for the founding of the local Greens.57
Networking Organizations
Local solar energy entrepreneurs, many of them Wyhl veterans, decided
they needed an energy agency to promote their products and services.
Finding no support at higher levels, they cooperated in founding a regis-
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tered association, FESA e.V., locally.58 FESA (Association for the Promotion of
Energy and Solar [in the] Freiburg Region) promotes renewable energy
through public relations work and community education. It also conducts
educational programs in many local schools. FESA’s goal is “decentralized
and democratic energy provision on the basis of renewable energies, from
which municipalities and local citizens enjoy the profits.”59
FESA was a partner in founding the Energy Agency Regio Freiburg, along
with the City of Freiburg and some members of the Chamber of Crafts, in
1999. The regional agency acts as a consultant and liaison for renewable
energy projects. It is the largest and one of the oldest regional energy agen-
cies in Baden-Württemberg. The agency partners with the nearby Fraun-
hofer Institute and multiple universities on projects, and roughly half of its
thirty employees are students doing internships with the agency. The agency
consults on approximately 100 projects a year. Their clients range from indi-
viduals to communities to the federal government. CEO Rainer Schüle
worked at the Eco-Institute before starting with Regio Freiburg. These agen-
cies have been a critical force for expanding the regional renewables net-
work and keeping local projects alive when more conventionally minded
investors and public officials balked at supporting new ideas. 
Another type of networking is done by companies created to help small
investors participate in the local renewable energy boom, especially with
wind turbines. FESA founded a limited liability company, FESA GmbH. It
collects small investments and has helped hundreds of investors navigate
the permitting and construction processes. Green Electricity Group Freiburg
is another such company with a different organizational structure. Its direc-
tor and principal investor, Andreas Markowsky, says his group tries to offer
investment opportunities to those who live in the place where the project
will be built, from the landowner (who receives rent) to investors in the tur-
bine. They have a total of 2,500 investors in 200 facilities. They also work
with some sixty municipalities. His firm does the management—from orga-
nizing the applications to maintenance of the facility—in return for a
 percentage. Markovsky says citizen demand is “enormously high;” their
projects have all sold out now for years.60 Municipal utilities are also offer-
ing citizens opportunities to invest in local renewables projects.
“Plus-energy” Villages
After the Chernobyl accident in 1986, several families in the south Baden
village of Schönau came together to take local action against nuclear power.
They decided to try to buy the local grid in order not to have to purchase
electricity from a utility that owned nuclear plants.61 The “Schönau Electric-
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ity Rebels” weathered a determined campaign by the utility and eventually
won the right to form their own company. They were one of the first grid
operators in Germany to offer power exclusively from renewable energy
sources. Their battle attracted international attention and inspired other
German villages to follow in their footsteps. The feed-in law enabled them
eventually to sell clean energy nationwide. “Plus-energy villages,” which
produce more electricity than they use from renewable sources and sell the
excess, have become a growing trend throughout Germany. I will profile
two of the most well known here.
One township Markovsky’s firm works with is Freiamt in the southern
Black Forest, where seventy people are waiting to invest in the next wind
project. Freiamt is a plus-energy community and a big tourist draw. Its
prospects were not always so rosy. Five far-flung villages make up Freiamt,
with no real historical community center. This was a deeply rural area of
mostly marginal dairy farmers. Traditionally, people from Freiamt were
employed as service personnel in the more prosperous towns of the region.
Freiamt’s political leaders worried about dwindling sources of employment
and flight to urban areas. After the first feed-in law of 1990, investors from
outside the region began approaching the farmers to lease their land for
wind turbines. The locals feared that outsiders would come to control their
land and pocket the profits, so they joined together to become energy entre-
preneurs. Residents invested in several wind turbines. Some beef and dairy
farmers switched to “energy farming” with biomass. They pump excess
heat to public buildings and feed electricity into the grid. Many installed
solar panels on barns and farmhouse roofs. The mayor says her office has
supported the developments, but it was farmers who took the initiative. 
Freiamt has experienced a boom in ecotourism that has buoyed the
guesthouses and restaurants as well as the farms. The mayor calls it “energy
tourism” and credits Freiamt’s quick-thinking farmers for starting early,
before the second feed-in law made plus-energy villages commonplace.
One result that may not be visible to outsiders is a clear improvement in
the self-confidence of the citizens here. “Now we are Freiamt and we’re
proud,” she says. “Freiamt cannot go back,” she adds.62
The township of St. Peter is a plus-energy village in the Upper Black For-
est. It produces more than 100 percent of its electricity usage and also
pumps residual heat to most of the village, including its famous Benedictine
abbey, school, and shopping center. St. Peter has a community energy co-
op that uses wood pellet gasification and wood chip combustion from local
sources. The idea came from a Stammtisch of mostly young, idealistic resi-
dents. Wind turbines already existed in the township, and this group
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wanted to develop additional renewables-based projects. They hit on the
idea of cogeneration of electricity and heat using local resources. Many
farms and forestry operations in the area had more scrap wood than they
could use and were willing to contribute it regularly. In principle, the group
wanted to keep the energy production local—“a step toward world peace is
to become independent of oil,” says Markus Bohnert, Managing Director of
the co-op.63 Another goal was public participation—the co-op wanted its
leadership to be democratic and transparent. They held open meetings and
went door-to-door to find investors. Since wood gasification would be more
expensive at first than oil, they argued in terms of the environmental virtues
of wood rather than price. They found enough takers to lay the pipes for
heating village homes. 
The wood chip co-op has made the village famous. The co-op sold out
its heating capacity and has more demand than it can fulfill. St. Peter has
become an energy tourism destination visited by others who want to under-
take similar projects in their own municipalities. Bohnert says the local
restaurants profit from the increase in tourism, and everyone wants to see
the “green Stammtisch” where the idea was hatched. Their sister village, St.
Märgen, has formed its own co-op and implemented a similar project. One
positive aspect is that, through the co-op, neighbors achieve positive change
together. Another is the embrace of a progressive technology. These two
things combined, says Bohnert, give local citizens “a completely different
strength” and create a rallying point for the community. The co-op held its
grand opening in the abbey courtyard to convey that the project, like the
grand old sanctuary, belongs to the village.
In sum, a dense network of interconnected actors in politics, education,
research, farming, and business gave Freiburg the ingredients needed for
regional leadership in renewables: cutting-edge research, a skilled workforce,
manufacturing and small business. The network of innovation formed well
before there was federal support for renewables, and it was motivated in
large part by opposition to the core industry and state players. It remains
firmly anchored in a cultural milieu that favors local, environmentally
friendly action. Figure 2 depicts this regional network.
The Renewable Energy Act of 2000 boosted the already flourishing solar
network in the Freiburg region. Farmers, city residents, public works
departments, and whole villages invested in renewables. The research net-
work in the Freiburg region continued to grow as well. This development
took on a life of its own as the region’s green reputation grew. Freiburg won
numerous “green city” designations and elected one of Germanys first
Green mayors. Not all renewables businesses have succeeded, but the bot-
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tom-up model of energy investment and innovation is firmly anchored in
the population. A 2012 survey showed that respondents from this region
support the energy transition more strongly than elsewhere in Germany
and even elsewhere in Baden-Württemberg. They also express more will-
ingness to invest personally in renewable technologies.64 Freiburg has been
recognized nationally and internationally for its environmental orientation.
The “solar region” designation has become a marketing factor for the whole
region and a professional advantage for those who have trained there. 
Reform of the Renewable Energy Act: Putting the Genie 
Back in the Bottle?
Germany’s energy transition has empowered citizens nationwide to become
entrepreneurs and investors. As of 2013, roughly half of installed renew-
ables capacity was locally owned by individuals and farmers, while only 5
percent was owned by the big utilities. Moreover, renewable energies had
created 371, 400 jobs.65 As the energy transition progresses, however, tech-
nological and political issues have arisen that tend to set the decentralized,
local model against the model of change from the institutional core. One
such issue has to do with the future role of conventional power sources. As
a recent New York Times article notes, “the big German utilities are warning—
or pleading, perhaps—that the revolution cannot be allowed to go forward
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without them.”66 But, they are having a hard time operating profitably in
the current constellation. Utilities argue that there is too much renewable
energy in the grid, flooding it especially during the middle of the day and
sending wholesale power prices plummeting. It is not profitable for utilities
to power conventional plants up and down to cover for intermittent power
from renewables. And their investments in large-scale offshore wind farms,
incentivized by the changes to the Renewable Energy Act, are beset by
costly technological difficulties.67 “We were late entering into the renewable
energy market—possibly too late,” said RWE chief executive Peter Terium
recently, by way of explaining the utility giant’s $3.8 billion annual loss.68
Another issue is rising consumer energy prices and concerns that the
costs of the energy transition are falling disproportionately on less well-to-
do individuals. The Renewable Energy Act locks in the rates given to
renewables producers who feed into the grid. Consumers pay a surcharge
on their electricity bills that is supposed to reflect the difference between
these rates and electricity wholesale prices.69 As the latter have declined,
partly due to technological innovation, the surcharge has risen. This evokes
several socioeconomic justice issues. One is that the law has exempted
many industrial customers from the surcharge in order to aid industrial
competitiveness. These customers use 25 percent of Germany’s power but
pay only 2 percent of the surcharge.70 Another is that urban residents, espe-
cially renters, have fewer opportunities to benefit by becoming small pro-
ducers themselves. Renewable energy is also distributed unevenly among
the federal states, benefiting some regions more than others.71 There is an
emerging role for the center in ensuring an even distribution of costs and
benefits of the transition.
Finally, conflicts have arisen within the environmentalist community
over the effects of renewable energy installations on wildlife and land-
scapes.72 This is particularly true of onshore wind projects, which are meet-
ing some resistance even in very pro-renewables areas like the Upper Black
Forest. Concerns have also been raised regarding the wildlife effects of
water turbines and energy transmission lines. These issues have not signifi-
cantly dampened public support for the energy transition, which remains at
nearly 90 percent, but they have made the public look more critically on its
implementation.73
Periodic revisions of the act have enabled the government to tinker with
the central-local balance and the distribution of costs and benefits of the
energy transition. The 2012 revisions shifted support for renewables to
large-scale projects, such as offshore wind farms, in addition to temporary
increases in support for coal and natural gas extraction more compatible
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with the centralized model of energy production. The government has been
trying since the 2009 revisions to discourage the continued growth of small-
scale solar energy production, arguing that the grid technology will not sup-
port it.74 The feed-in rates paid to small solar producers are also often
blamed for the rise in the surcharge, an assertion disputed by the Fraun-
hofer Institute in Freiburg as well as other expert institutions.75 Despite
these efforts, private installation of solar has continued to overshoot govern-
ment estimates. The cost has dropped so precipitously that it would nearly
be worthwhile to install roof panels without any feed-in payment at all. The
2014 revisions try a new tack, designating “corridors” for development with
target limits to increases in solar, onshore wind, and biomass capacity, the
forms most commonly invested in locally. For the first time the government
will also levy a portion of the surcharge on those who produce solar power
for their own use(rooftop solar on family houses is still exempted).
Conclusion
Germany is the largest industrial country to undertake a rapid wholesale
shift to renewable energy. We can better understand how this unprece-
dented development came about by examining the relationship between
the state and inside and outside groups. In Dryzek’s terms, this study has
shown how a passive exclusive state may inadvertently foster change. Partly
because of their exclusion from the core of the state, citizen initiative
groups of the 1970s developed a wide-ranging critique of the technocratic
growth society, which crystallized around anti-nuclear protest. They also
developed a new model for a decentralized, eco-friendly, grassroots-democ-
ratic society, from which support for renewable energy grew. As renewable
energy has become more mainstream, so has this model, and it challenges
the corporatist model of state-societal relations. 2013 survey data show that
the vast majority of Germans support a rapid, decentralized transition to
renewables.76 A majority are critical of the Merkel government’s support for
the big energy players despite widespread concerns about costs and fair-
ness. Any recentralization of energy production looks to many like an
attack on local communities. 
This study supports Dryzek’s insight that a passive exclusive state such as
Germany can be changed from the outside in the absence of much institu-
tional change at the center. In the German case, the lack of access inspired a
vibrant oppositional civil society that, while unable to impinge on the core
economic imperative of the state, persistently challenged its legitimation
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imperative. The movement’s very exclusion from the core of state power,
along with the anchoring of the alternative model in German society, kept
the potential for grassroots activism alive and gave the push for renewables
its community focus. Activists developed a two-pronged pattern of influ-
ence in which they infiltrated some federal institutions and mobilized for
grassroots protest when necessary. As Dryzek would predict, the Ministry of
Economics and Energy still favors a more centralized model and corporate
producers but has been forced to take alternatives seriously as their propo-
nents built a network of counter-expertise, activism, and professional orga-
nizations that could not be suppressed or ignored.
Like Toke, I would take ecological modernization theory a step further
by highlighting the key role played by oppositional groups in technological
innovation. As the Freiburg case shows, renewable energies spread through
networks of innovation that were not dependent on major support from the
center. Renewable energy does now impinge on the state’s core economic
imperatives, and it has resulted in institutional change, but the response
from the center has not been to embrace the innovations made at the
periphery as both ecological modernization and institutionalist theorists
would expect. This study goes further than Toke in explaining why it is dif-
ficult to do so. The technologies favored by the traditional core players and
the challengers are embedded in two different models of state-societal rela-
tions and economic organization, one centralized and top-down, the other
decentralized and bottom-up. The uneasy coexistence of the two competing
models, each with its own power base, characterizes German politics today.
Reconciling them will be one of the primary challenges for German politics
as the energy transition unfolds.
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